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TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL GROTIUS LECTURE
Martti Koskenniemi of the University of Helsinki and discussant Anne
Orford of the University of Melbourne Law School provided the
Twenty-First Annual Grotius Lecture on Wednesday, March 27, 2019,
at 5:00 p.m.*

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POPULIST
MOMENT:
A COMMENT ON MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI’S
ENCHANTED BY THE TOOLS? INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ENLIGHTENMENT
ANNE ORFORD**
I. INTERPRETING THE BACKLASH............................... 429
II. LIFE AFTER TRUTH ...................................................... 437

It is a great privilege to have been invited to discuss Professor Martti
Koskenniemi’s Grotius Lecture. Martti Koskenniemi is widely
recognized as one of the most distinguished scholars, practitioners,
and teachers of international law in our time, and he has been and
continues to be an inspiration to many international lawyers around
the world. It is a particular pleasure to have the honor of commenting
on his lecture given its timely and pressing themes.
* This lecture was also published in the ASIL Proceedings of the 113th Annual
Meeting (2019).
** Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor, Michael D. Kirby Chair of
International Law, and Australian Research Council Laureate Fellow, Melbourne
Law School.
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Koskenniemi’s lecture addresses the question of backlash against
global governance and its relationship to international law.1 There is a
widespread consensus amongst commentators, policymakers, and
academics that the form of international legal order that had emerged
over the course of the twentieth century is today facing serious
challenges. Many international lawyers share the sense that the myriad
high-profile instances of leaving, denouncing, withdrawing, and
unsigning over the past decade signal that something more significant
than standard forms of resistance to or critique of specific legal
regimes may be playing out. In addition, much commentary in the
fields of international law and international relations interprets this
moment of withdrawals and challenges as somehow related to the
increasingly vocal backlash to global governance expressed by
populist movements from both the left and the right.2
Koskenniemi frames his foray into that debate in the language of
enlightenment and disenchantment. This is language made familiar
through the sociology of Max Weber and in the legal thinking of
Scandinavian and American legal realists. What those traditions share
is a Protestant heritage. Felix Cohen once described American realism
as “an assault upon all dogmas”—a mode of thinking that was, Cohen
pointed out, “naturally of special prominence in a protestant
movement.”3 Like many protestant movements, these forms of critique
insist that we should not trust metaphysical or magical thinking or
1. Martti Koskenniemi, Enchanted by the Tools? International Law and
Enlightenment, 35 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 397, 397–426 (2020).
2. See, e.g., Craig Calhoun, Brexit Is a Mutiny Against the Cosmopolitan Elite,
33 NEW PERSP. Q. 50 (2016); Philip Alston, The Populist Challenge to Human
Rights, 9 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1 (2017); Eric Posner, Liberal Internationalism and
the Populist Backlash 1 (Univ. Chi., Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper,
No. 606, 2017); Francis Fukuyama & Robert Muggah, Populism Is Poisoning the
Global Liberal Order, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 29, 2018; House of Lords Select
Committee on International Relations, UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order,
HL Paper 250 (Dec. 2018); Constance Duncombe & Tim Dunne, After Liberal
World Order, 94 INT’L AFF. 25 (2018); James Crawford, The Current Political
Discourse Concerning International Law, 81 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2018); Laurence
Burgorgue-Larsen, Populism and Human Rights: From Disenchantment to
Democratic Riposte 1 (iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 156, 2019).
3. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 822 (1935).
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place our faith in false icons or empty rituals—we should not think in
terms of abstractions and become enchanted by our tools, but instead
relentlessly subject our faith, our institutions, and our practices to
critique.
This is a tradition of permanent revolution. Liberalism, and
particularly liberal internationalism, is one site for the unfolding of
this revolutionary tradition in the modern world. Liberals over the
centuries have asserted the right and indeed duty of every person to
exercise their liberty of conscience, have been committed to practices
of militant iconoclasm and interpretative freedom, and have engaged
in relentlessly anti-hierarchical and anti-institutional challenges to
corruption and false prophets. This powerful and self-conflicted
tradition is, in the words of James Simpson, “[i]n flight from nothing
so energetically as from prior forms of itself.”4
Koskenniemi puts that tradition of Protestant self-critique to work
in relation to the field of international law and its responsibility for the
current moment of authoritarian populist backlash against global
governance. His argument addresses two key themes in that regard.
The first is that the backlash is in part due to a wrong turn toward a
liberal culture war that the field took in the 1960s and that intensified
in the 1990s. The second is that the backlash should be understood as
a reaction to liberal claims of expertise. In the following sections I will
respond to each claim.

I. INTERPRETING THE BACKLASH
Trying to make sense of the relations between backlash to global
rule, populist politics, the rise of authoritarian leaders, and specific
international legal arrangements is not straightforward. International
law and institutions do not represent a coherent project, and it is
difficult to diagnose what precisely has fueled populist support for
withdrawal from international legal regimes or institutions even within
a particular country, let alone globally. It is possible to attribute the
causes of anti-globalist backlash to any one of numerous projects,
institutions, events, or agreements. As a result, the attempts to connect
4. JAMES SIMPSON, PERMANENT REVOLUTION: THE REFORMATION
ILLIBERAL ROOTS OF LIBERALISM (2019).
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the dots between populism, backlash, and international law often seem
more like the conduct of a Rorschach test, in which each commentator
reveals their perception of where the ambitions of international law
went too far. For some, the problem is the institutionalization of farreaching trade and investment agreements. For others, the mistake was
the resort to force in the name of liberal values. For yet others, the
overambitious expansion of human rights, leading to the breakup of
national cultures and threats to social and religious norms, was the step
too far that led to the backlash and to the emergence of culture wars
that now threaten the institutions of global governance. What these
approaches share is a broader set of arguments around the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of an overly ambitious liberal internationalism.
For Koskenniemi, the populist backlash should be understood in
relation to the wrong turn that the field took when it moved in the
1960s beyond the traditional form of liberal internationalism that
treated nation states as the bearers of autonomy and of selfdetermination. That form of liberalism, he argues, understood itself to
be limited—it did not purport to constrain the politics or the “culture”
within each state. Deciding upon the nature and limits of government
was left to the authority of those who ruled. The wrong turn that
international law took after the 1960s involved moving beyond that
horizontal form of liberalism toward a focus on the liberties of
individuals within states. For Koskenniemi, the 1990s was the decade
in which that wrong turn was consolidated. He gives as a key example
Thomas Franck’s manifesto for a new world, entitled The Empowered
Self. Koskenniemi cites Franck’s claim that “each individual is
entitled to choose an identity reflecting personal preference,”5 treating
it as part of a longer argument arcing back to the Hart-Devlin debate
in the 1960s according to which “[s]ociety had no legitimate claim to
enforce ‘morals.’”6 For Koskenniemi, these examples explain both the
enchantment and the disenchantment with rights:
5. Koskenniemi, supra note 1 (citing THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED
SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 39 (1999)).
6. See id. (Koskenniemi refers there to “the famous Hart-Devlin debate in the
1960s.”). See generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965);
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, MORALITY (1963) (The Hart-Devlin debate over the
relation between law and morality took place in the context of Wolfenden
Committee proposal to decriminalize male homosexual activity in private).
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This explains the initial enchantment with rights. What could be greater
than to have a preference to override every other consideration? As more
and more preferences were translated into rights, activists began to worry.
If everything was a right, nothing was. How to separate “genuine” from
“fake” rights?7

So in Koskenniemi’s telling, it is the human rights project of liberal
elites, consolidated in the 1990s, that has resulted in “the break-up of
homogenous national cultures; the loosening of social and religious
norms; the rise of commercially incentivized non-conformism,” and
led to the backlash conducted in the style of “culture wars.” For
Koskenniemi, “the backlash is not about economic deprivation” but is
rather the expression of a form of “status anxiety” motivated by “the
emergence of a universal politics of human rights that was deeply
intolerant of traditional values and hierarchies.”8
I agree with Koskenniemi’s analysis that the populist moment is a
symptom of the limits of certain forms of liberalism pursued on a
global scale. However, I disagree with his diagnosis of which aspects
of international legal liberalism have fueled the backlash to
international law, with his interpretation of the limits to the liberal
project being cultural rather than material, and with his interpretation
of what the populist moment represents in relation to those questions.
International law did not become a vehicle for forms of liberalism
directed at protecting the rights of individuals only after the 1960s. To
be specific, international law has been a vehicle for protecting the
rights and property of foreign nationals from at least as far back as the
7. Id.
8. See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and the Far Right: Reflections
on Law and Cynicism, ANNUAL T.M.C. ASSER LECTURE 2018 (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.asser.nl/annual-lecture/annual-tmc-asser-lecture-2018; see also Joseph
Weiler, The European Culture War 2003–2019, Herbert W. Vaughan Memorial
Lecture, The Federalist Society, Harvard Law School (Feb. 6, 2019) (arguing
similarly that the backlash against the European Union is a result of the “culture
war” conducted by E.U. institutions in the name of human rights against Christian
values, identity, and patriotism rather than by a concern with inequality or economic
well-being); see Erick Trickey, Europe’s Culture Crisis, HARV. L. TODAY (Feb. 13,
2019), https://today.law.harvard.edu/europes-culture-crisis (providing a report on
this lecture).
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Jay Treaty Commissions of 1794, and this aspect of liberal
internationalism has been steadily consolidated and extended in the
centuries since. The 1960s does represent a turning point in that
respect, but the turning point is not the “commercially-incentivized
non-conformism” produced by human rights (to use Koskenniemi’s
phrase), but rather the turn to international law as a vehicle for
protecting the rights of property-holders and investors against the risks
of redistribution, whether in the form of decolonization in the South
or of leftist social policymaking in the North.
During the 1960s, foreign investors and their home states began to
perceive decolonization as posing a potential threat to the security and
profitability of investments in newly independent states and sought to
introduce greater protections for investments and private property. A
key procedural step was the development by the World Bank of a form
of international machinery to address disputes between states and
investors, with the resulting International Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States (ICSID Convention) 1966 establishing a center for
arbitration and providing that the resulting awards would be
recognized and enforceable in the courts of member states.9 In
addition, as states entered into a growing number of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), broad interpretations of substantive
provisions addressing direct or indirect “expropriation” increasingly
served to protect investors against the effects on profits of routine
government regulation aimed at protecting public health, the
environment, or consumer safety. Whereas in the century following
the Jay Treaty, international claims processes had been directed
toward loss suffered during conflict, in the era of BITs the focus of
arbitral scrutiny became the everyday conduct of government
regulation and its impact on the profits of foreign investors.10
The creation of a transnational regime for investment protection
was consolidated and expanded during the 1990s with the negotiation
9. ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 25 (2012).
10. Heather L. Bray, Understanding Change: Evolution from International
Claims Commissions to Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND HISTORY 102, 104, 118 (Stephan W. Schill, Christian J.
Tams & Rainer Hofmann eds., 2018).
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of many new BITs and other broad-reaching agreements such as the
Energy Charter Treaty and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). To give some sense of the reach of this form of
international adjudication, by the end of 2017, a total of 855 known
investor-state claims had been brought, of which the majority were
brought against “developing countries” or “transitional economies,”
and the majority brought by developed country investors (with 257
claimants from the United States and the Netherlands alone).11 In cases
decided against the state in favor of the investor, the average amount
claimed was $1.3 billion and the average amount awarded was $504
million.12
The 1990s was also the point at which international law began to be
seen as a vehicle for entrenching a particular approach to economic
policymaking through regional and international economic
integration. To take one example, the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) at the completion of the Uruguay Round led to a
significant expansion in the range of activities brought within the
scope of the international trade regime. The idea that international
integration should ensure that trade was not only “free” but also “fair”
had been argued by trade lawyers during the 1970s and 1980s and
became a rallying cry for the U.S. administration during the Uruguay
Round negotiations. The ambition was to address “the pressures put
upon importing economies by a myriad of subtle (and sometimes not
so subtle) government aids to exports.”13 In the words of trade lawyer
John Jackson, while consumers in importing countries may benefit
from the cheaper prices of commodities produced with the support of
foreign governments, “the domestic producer feels outraged that while
playing by the free enterprise rules he is losing the game to producers
not abiding by such rules.”14 The Uruguay Round negotiations resulted
in a raft of new trade agreements that took an ambitious approach to
disciplining state regulation in the interests of economic liberalization.
Those agreements significantly expanded the range of activities
brought within the scope of the multilateral trade regime to include
11. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2018, at 91 (2018).
12. Id. at 95.
13. John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12
J. WORLD TRADE 93, 95 (1978).
14. Id.
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trade-related aspects of intellectual property, trade in services,
technical barriers to trade (such as rules relating to product labelling),
and the harmonization of public health and safety regulations.
The WTO dispute settlement system was referred to as the “jewel
in the crown” of the organization.15 Scholars argued that “the
importance of the mere existence of the Appellate Body to a shift in
organizational legal culture could not be overestimated.”16 It was
lauded as an approach to mandatory dispute settlement that
“surpasses” in “effectiveness and sophistication” anything “achieved
by other international tribunals, such as the International Court of
Justice.”17 For those who saw international law as contributing to the
creation of a liberal international order, “WTO admission and
participation would set up a kind of tutorial in rule-of-law values” and
might provide the means to push a state “not only to change its trade
and trade-related practices, but also to reform its domestic
government, liberalize its political system, expand the rights and
opportunities of women and other disadvantaged groups, and so on.”18
It is these economic aspects of liberal internationalism that have
been the subject of the most intense backlash politics.19 International
investment law was the first field in which commentators began to
express concerns about a backlash against liberal internationalism, in
the context of mounting criticism of the perceived excesses of
investor-state dispute settlement (or ISDS) awards.20 This began with
15. Cosette D. Creamer, From the WTO’s Crown Jewel to its Crown of Thorns,
113 AJIL UNBOUND 51 (2019).
16. Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats:
Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35
J. WORLD TRADE 191, 199 (2001).
17. See Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in
International Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in THE EU, THE
WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 35
(Joseph H.H. Weiler ed., 2000).
18. Remarks of Lori Fisler Damrosch, Human Rights, Terrorism and Trade, 96
ASIL PROC. 128, 130 (2002).
19. See also Anne Orford, A Global Rule of Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO THE RULE OF LAW (Martin Loughlin & Jens Meierhenrich eds.,
forthcoming 2019).
20. See THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS
AND REALITY (Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung & Claire Balchin
eds., 2010).
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the withdrawal from the procedural ICSID Convention by a group of
Latin American states (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) beginning in
2007, part of a broader process through which the newly elected leftwing governments in the region responded to the popular backlash
against neoliberal policies and attempted to reverse the privatization
of essential services and resources that had taken place under
International Monetary Fund and World Bank supervision during the
1990s.21 Since then, numerous states in Latin America, Asia, and
Africa have announced their intention to terminate some or all of their
bilateral investment treaties or BITs, including Bolivia, Ecuador,
India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Venezuela.
Perhaps more strikingly, as Western states increasingly became
respondents in investor-state proceedings, a growing political
resistance to ISDS emerged within Canada, Europe, and more recently
the United States, as evidenced by the popular challenge to inclusion
of ISDS provisions in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership between the EU and the United States and the EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. In March 2018, the
Court of Justice of the EU held in the Achmea case that ISDS
provisions in BITs between EU member states were incompatible with
EU law, and all EU member states have since declared their agreement
to terminate their intra-EU BITs by December 2019. In addition, Italy
and Russia have withdrawn from or unsigned the Energy Charter
Treaty, one of the major multilateral agreements under which ISDS
proceedings have been brought in recent years. According to
UNCTAD, in 2017 the investment treaty regime “reached a turning
point,” with only eighteen new investment treaties concluded, the
lowest number since 1983. Perhaps more significantly, for the first
time the number of effective investment treaty terminations in that
year (twenty-two) was higher than the number of new treaties
concluded.22
21. See Fabio Costa Morosini & Michelle Sanchez Badin, Petrobras in Bolivia:
Is There a Rule of Law in the “Primitive” World?, in GLOBAL PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ADJUDICATION WITHOUT FRONTIERS 381 (Horatia Muir
Watt, Lucia Bíziková, Agatha Brandão de Oliveira & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo
eds., 2019) (providing a discussion of the context informing legal disputes over
energy resources in Bolivia during that period).
22. See UNCTAD, supra note 11, at 88; see also UNCTAD, WORLD

436

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[35:3

A similar backlash against global economic governance is
evident in the field of trade agreements, with the United States
initiating a renegotiation of NAFTA and “unsigning” the TransPacific Partnership, and the UK signaling its withdrawal from the EU.
In addition, many states have bridled at the limitations on freedom of
action and regulation that the expansive interpretations of WTO
disciplines by the Appellate Body have imposed. In particular, the
United States has initiated efforts to restore the balance of rights and
obligations to which it understands itself to have agreed. Both the
Obama and Trump administrations have blocked appointments to the
Appellate Body in protest at a series of decisions about which the
United States disagreed, leading to a situation in which the Appellate
Body may cease to be able to function after December 2019.23 For
trade lawyers, the challenge to NAFTA and the impasse at the WTO
Appellate Body are symptoms of “the curtailment of key features of
the liberal order, primarily international legal adjudication’,24 and
signal ‘the end of an era.”25
The 1960s is not then significant because it saw liberal lawyers go
too far in relation to human rights. Indeed, there is nothing in the field
of international human rights law that comes close to the systems for
enforcing investment protection and economic integration discussed
above, and outside Europe and the Inter-American system the impact
of international human rights law domestically is minimal.
International human rights lawyers can only dream of such influence
and effect. Rather, the 1960s was a decade in which liberation
movements in the North and South placed the question of the material
limits to the liberal economic order squarely on the international
agenda. As I have argued in detail elsewhere, the colonies had long
served as one vehicle for dealing with the material conditions of
INVESTMENT REPORT (2019) (showing that the number of terminations continued to
rise to twenty-four in 2018, but countries entered into forty new investment
agreements).
23. Manfred Elsig et al., Trump Is Fighting an Open War on Trade. His Stealth
War on Trade May Be Even More Important, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2017); Gregory
Shaffer, A Tragedy in the Making? The Decline of Law and the Return of Power in
International Trade Relations, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2019).
24. Sergio Puig, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: A Glimpse into
the Geoeconomic World Order, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 56 (2019).
25. Shaffer, supra note 23, at 17.
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liberalization—that is, for offering the space perceived as necessary
for addressing perceived problems of “surplus” populations produced
by economic liberalization, and for ensuring access to new sources of
resources and markets.26 With decolonization, the material limits to
economic liberalism have become international rather than colonial
questions. Those material limits register both in terms of human limits
and of ecological limits—how to respond to the people who are
routinely dispossessed or displaced to enable new forms of economic
liberalization, and how to address the exhaustion of the capacity of the
natural world to act as energy resource and waste disposal unit?
The interrelated financial, climate, and refugee crises of the early
twenty-first century gave a new urgency to questions about the
capacity of international law and institutions to respond to radical
social, economic, political, and ecological transformations. It seems
clear, as it has seemed clear to those resisting the excesses of industrial
capitalism for centuries, that a planet full of people exercising the
kinds of liberty imagined for European men in previous eras is not
sustainable.27 For communities that are vulnerable, the disruptions
posed by climate change will present as a matter of survival—for
communities that are prosperous, they will present as a matter of
security and geopolitics. From either perspective, the need to find
policy solutions to mass displacement and resource insecurity on a
global scale, while the dominant transnational political class is
committed to deregulation and minimal state intervention, seems
daunting. Where then does that leave international law?

II. LIFE AFTER TRUTH
This then brings me to the second major theme of Koskenniemi’s
26. Anne Orford, Food Security, Free Trade, and the Battle for the State, 11 J.
INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 1 (2015); Anne Orford, Law, Economics, and the History of
Free Trade: A Response, 11 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 155 (2015).
27. See AMITAV GHOSH, THE GREAT DERANGEMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND
THE UNTHINKABLE 111 (2016) (noting that while industrial capitalism has met with
resistance on every continent, in Asia this resistance was articulated by figures of
great moral authority who pointed directly to the issue of the material limits of
liberalism. Ghosh quotes the 1928 pronouncement of Mahatma Gandhi: “God forbid
that India should ever take to industrialism after the manner of the West. If an entire
nation of 300 millions took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the world
bare like locusts.”).
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lecture, an analysis of the relation of our current populist era of politics
to more fundamental questions about knowledge, facts, and expertise.
Here I am in furious agreement with Koskenniemi’s prioritizing of
these questions, and specifically his relating of a faith in
instrumentalized reason to the question of climate politics. I would,
however, like to complicate somewhat his sense that in the face of this
challenge, “we should adopt the species perspective.”28
Climate change is indeed presented to us as a “species” or planetary
problem—indeed it emerged out of planetary sciences (it was James
Hansen, the director of NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space Studies,
who was one of the first scientists to begin alerting governments and
journalists to the “greenhouse effect”). Yet there are no political
institutions that are adequate to a problem constituted on this scale, or
that can provide a basis for the kind of global regulation or governance
that would be capable of addressing a problem understood in planetary
terms. Big data creates “hyperobjects” for which we as yet have no
political subject.29 Attempts to rely upon international politics and
lawmaking in their existing forms—the forms that brought us
economic globalization—have failed to produce a solution to the
problem of climate change. As Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued, “the
global in global warming means something different from the global
in globalization.”30 The globe of global warming involves the earth as
a planet—the globe of globalization involves a web of human relations
that have been created in pursuit of profit and power. The problem of
global warming has consequences for how we think about the history
and the future of globalization. The politics of international
lawmaking that has brought us both globalization and global warming
is not proving capable of addressing the ecological, financial, political
and social upheavals to which this experiment in revolutionary
liberalism is leading.
We can see this illustrated in the battleground over facts and science
in current debates about climate change. Despite, or perhaps because
of, the weight that has been given to facts as established by science
28. Koskenniemi, supra note 1.
29. TIMOTHY MORTON, HYPEROBJECTS: PHILOSOPHY AND ECOLOGY AFTER THE
END OF THE WORLD (2013).
30. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Afterword, 116 S. ATL. Q. 163, 166 (2017).
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and expertise in public policy, the idea of science as an authoritative
form of knowledge is subjected to growing skepticism. This is a field
in which we see populist and counter-populist attempts to shape
climate politics from the right and the left, illustrated by the Gilets
Jaunes protests in France, the Extinction Rebellion actions in London,
and student climate strikes globally.31 The significance of scientific
expertise, including that of legal science, is being posed as a political
or democratic question because of the weight that such scientific
expertise is today being asked to bear in policymaking. Political
concerns about the viability and justice of a particular political and
economic system of resource extraction and distribution have been
translated into a highly technical debate about levels and effects of
carbon emissions.32 The effect of the demands that this policy reliance
on data places upon scientific method is well illustrated by the
resulting attacks on science by climate change deniers.
Is the answer to this era of post-truth to return to an era of truth and
to faith in reason? This is, after all, the suggestion we hear repeatedly.
Many commentators diagnose the problem today as being that
everyone has their own news bubble—the solution is to go back to
respected sources of news, like the New York Times, or respected
sources of intelligence, like the CIA or MI6. Yet, to take just one
example, for someone who has read the Chilcot Inquiry report
detailing the forms of intelligence failure involved in the move to the
war against Iraq in 2003, this is not a straightforward proposition.
Should we really take on trust that the information that is collected,
analyzed, and made available to the public through the interface
between intelligence, political, and media organizations represents the
31. See Cihan Aksan & Jon Bailes, One Question Gilets Jaunes, ST. NATURE
(June 6, 2019), https://stateofnatureblog.com/one-question-gilets-jaunes (providing
a range of analyses of the Gilets Jaunes movement that address its relation to and
significance for broader political struggles of working people); see also Étienne
Balibar, “Gilets Jaunes”: The Meaning of the Confrontation, OPEN DEMOCRACY
(Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/giletsjaunes-meaning-of-confrontation (presenting an interpretation of the Gilets Jaunes
as inventing a form of “counter-populism”).
32. See Gert Goeminne & Karen François, The Thing Called Environment: What
It Is and How to Be Concerned with It, 32 OXFORD LIT. REV. 109 (2010); Julia
Dehm, One Tonne of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (1tCO2e), in INTERNATIONAL
LAW’S OBJECTS 305 (Jessie Hohmann & Daniel Joyce eds., 2018).
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“facts,”33 or even more ambitiously, the “truth”? Was there ever a time
or a world in which people all accepted the truth purveyed by powerful
officials or influential journalists without question? Is the challenge of
the #MeToo movement, to mention another populist movement of our
era, posed by the fact that women are now allowed to make claims
about the conduct of powerful men where once we all believed what
the mainstream media told us about them? Or did mainstream
audiences, however we imagine them, just not know about those other
bubbles of whispered communication within which such stories have
always circulated, because those stories were not reflected in the
broadsheet press or the “public” sphere?
Of course, an era in which politicians in many countries invoke the
concept of “fake news” takes questions about truth, lies, facts, and
fictions to another level. In the face of the flexible approach to the
truth that dominates public debate at present, the desire for some
source of authoritative knowledge or information can be
overwhelming. Yet in this post-truth world, it is not just historians of
science but the communities on Twitter and Facebook who recognize
that facts only mean something and are only intelligible within a
broader system, and that the broader system will shape why facts are
produced and how they are used.34
I agree with Koskenniemi that there is no way back to a pre-post
truth world from here.35 It is difficult for lawyers in particular to
sustain a good faith appeal to the power and objectivity of “reason”
after a centuries-long discussion of the limits of such appeals,
informed by anti-formalist realism, aggressive originalist
contextualism, and the deployment of a “hermeneutic of suspicion”
against the idealist appeals of our opponents.36 To the extent we remain
33. See Mark Phythian, Intelligence Failure as a Mutually Reinforcing PoliticoIntelligence Dynamic: The Chilcot Report and the Nature of the Iraq WMD
Intelligence Failure, 87 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 196 (2018) (providing an analysis of the
aspects of the Chilcot Report that address intelligence failure).
34. See MARY POOVEY, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN FACT: PROBLEMS OF
KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCES OF WEALTH AND SOCIETY (1998) (discussing the
relation between facts and the broader system within which they are produced).
35. See, e.g., MARTIN JAY, REASON AFTER ITS ECLIPSE: ON LATE CRITICAL
THEORY (2016).
36. See Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in Contemporary
American Legal Thought, 25 L. & CRITIQUE 91 (2014) (providing further discussion
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“prisoners of reason,” this is not a form of reason that claims the ability
to establish a transcendent truth that lies beyond partisan politics or
argumentative practice.37 Rather, we operate according to a more
chastened form of reason, grounded on the logic of game theory,
public choice, or behavioral economics, in which the truth we are
invited to share is that each individual or nation state acts to further
their own self-interest.
The only way out of this dilemma, then, is onward, to what we
might call a post-post-truth world.38 The task facing us in the postpost-truth world involves breaking down the separation between facts
and values. In order to move beyond the strict separation of fact and
value, the task we face is not to abandon the appeal to facts or to truth,
but to recognize that the language of truth and facts is no longer a
trump card. There is no authority to which we can appeal that will
establish that our version of truth or our account of facts is the correct
one. There is an inescapable link between what we know and the social
conditions underpinning how we have come to know it. This helps to
make sense of why people might trust something that is “liked” by
their “friends” (to use the language of social media), rather than
trusting something that they are told is a “fact” by an expert. What
counts as evidence or facts or even truth is an effect of mediating
institutions, of particular techniques, of emotional attachments, and of
communities. Which truth we should prefer is then properly a question
of politics and of whose authority we trust.
Indeed if we look back to the birth of the experiment as a foundation
of scientific practice in Restoration England, we can see that the
“experimental philosophers” of the Enlightenment thought of the
laboratory not just as a place where experiments with air-pumps could
be conducted, but as a place where experiments in social order could
be attempted. These experiments took place in a context in which
revolutionary evangelical ideals of authenticity, transparency, and
visibility had sought to distinguish new social orders from corrupt
older institutions of church and monarchy. In that climate, the
on the operation of the “hermeneutic of suspicion”).
37. S. M. AMADAE, PRISONERS OF REASON: GAME THEORY AND NEOLIBERAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016).
38. I thank James Der Derian for this formulation.
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community of experimental philosophers was presented as a “model
of the ideal polity.”39 This was a community without an arbitrary ruler,
inhabiting a public space, involving free men who faithfully testified
to the results of the experiments they witnessed in order to produce
useful knowledge.40 The authority of scientific knowledge has always
been an effect of the political communities and the social relations
within and through which it is produced, and not just the techniques
of its production.41
The recognition that there are contested accounts of the facts and
values that found the practice of international law is then not the end
of the story, but rather the beginning of a new chapter. A particular
neoliberal model of international law triumphed in the late twentieth
century. Its potential displacement poses challenges and opportunities
for contemporary thinking about the role of law in international
politics. International legal systems and the politics they represent
must be “chosen and defended.”42 The return of history into this story
is valuable because it allows us to experience that sense of choice and
responsibility anew. The lesson from attempts at skirting around the
politics of issues such as energy policy is that there is no obvious way
forward except through embedding international law solutions to big
distributional questions within democratic politics.
Populism has returned as “a way of doing politics”—a way of doing
politics that involves “constructing a new subject of collective
action”—the people—”capable of reconfiguring a social order
experienced as unjust.”43 Yet that populist politics is ideologically
contested. This is why Chantal Mouffe has suggested we understand
our era as a “populist moment,” in which the dominant order is in
crisis, multiple struggles in the name of the people are being
39. STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR-PUMP:
HOBBES, BOYLE, AND THE EXPERIMENTAL LIFE 341 (1985).
40. Id.
41. See Anne Orford, Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law,
25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369 (2014) (discussing the broader implications of this insight
for international law).
42. See Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND POLITICAL THINKERS 25 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1998) (discussing
this point in relation to the rule of law more broadly).
43. CHANTAL MOUFFE, FOR A LEFT POPULISM 11 (2018).
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conducted, and no one political project has yet emerged victorious.44
Much will depend on which subjects of collective action are able to
gain the sympathy of experts, politicians, and the broader public—
which people as the subjects of populist politics are able to see their
demands treated with serious attention. The question to which today’s
anti-globalist politics gives rise, then, is not whether or not
international law should take account of the populist moment, but
which populism will succeed in universalizing its demands and what
role international lawyers will play in that process.

44. Id.; see also ENZO TRAVERSO, THE NEW FACES OF FASCISM: POPULISM AND
THE FAR RIGHT (2019).

